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Abstract 
 
A growing literature documents the existence of strategic political reactions to public 
expenditure in one jurisdiction on either neighboring or reference jurisdictions. The latter might 
give raise to downward expenditure spiral, or “race to the bottom”. However, in ascertaining the 
empirical triggers of such a process evidence is suggestive of markedly heterogeneous findings. 
Most of such heterogeneity can be traced back to study design and institutional differences. This 
paper contributes to the literature by applying meta-regression analysis to quantify the size and 
the direction of strategic inter-jurisdictional expenditure interactions controlling for study and 
institutional characteristics. We find several robust results beyond confirming that jurisdictions 
do engage in strategic expenditure interactions; namely that (i) interactions are weakening over 
time; (ii) strategic interactions are stronger among municipalities than among intermediate levels 
of government; and (iii) strategic interactions appear to emerge from tax competition rather than 
yardstick competition, with capital controls and fiscal decentralization shaping the magnitude of 
fiscal interactions. Hence, we conclude political decentralization structures that draw upon the 
political agency (yardstick competition) does not necessarily engender a ‘race to the bottom’. 
JEL-Code: H100, H500. 
Keywords: inter-jurisdictional competition, yardstick competition, meta-regression, expenditure 
competition. 
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1. Introduction  
Decades of political and social science research have revealed the existence of 
government strategic interactions (Breton, 1996). One of the most common interactions to take 
place within a democracy is the shaping of expenditures to suit the median voter’s preferences in 
a given jurisdiction. Yet, both competitive and cooperative interactions between rival 
jurisdictions can emerge in the provision of public goods and services (Volden, 2005). Rivalry 
between jurisdictions can occur at the same level (e.g. municipalities horizontally competing 
with each other) or between different levels (e.g. States competing with Federal governments). 
Government strategic interactions are likely to be heterogeneous across countries depending 
upon the limits of fiscal capacity,1 the contours of the political agency control, the informal rules 
of political culture and the effectiveness of electoral institutions. 
Competition between rival jurisdictions is important because it affects spending decisions 
(Berry, 2008; Besley and Rosen, 1998; Fiva and Rattso, 2006).2  However, the theoretical 
literature offers conflicting predictions regarding the existence and consequences of inter-
government interactions; the direction of the reaction to a rival government’s fiscal policies is 
theoretically ambiguous (Eggert, 2001; Brueckner, 2003). Intervening variables such as  in the 
design of political incentives and institutional constraints are found to be important in shaping 
both the direction and magnitude of inter-government interactions (Oates, 1999; Besley, 2006; 
Rom, 2006; Simeon, 2006). For example, “race to the bottom” models predict that inter-
government competition results in a downward bias in public expenditure (Oates, 1972). In these 
models, rival jurisdictions are assumed to have strong political and fiscal incentives to compete 
for mobile factors. Taxes and subsidies are used to compete for mobile capital and attract high-
1 By fiscal capacity we mean a class of factors such as the tax base, tax rates, the softness of the jurisdiction’s budget 
constraint and the availability of debt financing. 
2 Inter-jurisdictional competition can also affect policy adoption (Berry and Baybeck, 2005; Murillo and Martínez-
Gallardo, 2007). 
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income households, while also trying to discourage low-income households and welfare 
dependents.3 In a simple model where no other variables are accounted for, inter-jurisdictional 
competition is argued to erode redistributive expenditure, especially the provision of important 
either public or publically provided private goods. Consequently, public expenditure levels are 
argued to be sub-optimal.  
In contrast, when yardstick competition models are used to describe the mechanisms of 
fiscal competition the emergence if a ‘race to the bottom’ is far from clear.  Strategic expenditure 
interactions can arise from yardstick competition mechanisms where the fear of electoral 
punishment induces incumbent governments to compete with their rivals (Salmon, 1987; Besley 
and Case, 1995; Breton, 1996). Median voter type models predict that when faced with re-
election, governments might be reluctant to lower social services if the median voter uses them 
more than proportionally. Governments might also be reluctant to reduce public spending, 
particularly on “merit goods” such as health and education. Basinger and Hallerberg (2004) point 
out that the pressure on expenditure behavior to converge with rival jurisdictions is moderated by 
“domestic costs to reform”.  
Given the above considerations, it is theoretically unclear what the effects of inter-
government competition will be. Theoretical ambiguity increases when considering strategic 
interactions within multi-tiered governments (Besley and Rosen, 1998; Wilson, 1999).4 There is 
also a lack of consensus on the causes of fiscal interdependence.  
Theoretical ambiguity is matched by scattered and inconclusive empirical evidence, 
especially with respect to the size of interactions, as well as the institutional and economic 
determinants underpinning them. Berry (2008, p. 817) argues that: “… the evidence of wasteful 
3 ‘Desirable’ factors contribute to regional growth and development and to revenues for the jurisdiction, while 
‘undesirable’ factors add to social welfare expenditures (Craw, 2010). 
4 Ambiguity emerges also with regard to regulatory competition. For example, inter-jurisdictional competition can 
result in a race to the bottom in environmental regulations resulting in sub-optimal regulation that makes all states 
worse off, or it can lead to a “race to the top” (Konisky, 2007). 
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tax competition is largely anecdotal; the field has produced no systematic evidence of a fiscal 
race to the bottom …”.  
Our main contribution to the literature is to show that there is actually sufficient evidence 
from which to conclude that jurisdictions do play expenditure games and engage in strategic 
expenditure interactions. We also show that it is possible to identify the causes of inter-
government competition; interactions appear to emerge from tax competition rather than 
yardstick competition.  
In this paper we assess comprehensively and systematically the evidence on inter-
jurisdictional strategic interactions (competition). We apply the statistical tools of meta-
regression analysis (MRA) to the existing evidence base. An assessment of the empirical 
literature is presently missing. Our MRA is not a literature review. Rather, we use MRA to 
analyze statistically several dimensions of the literature, some of which have not been explored 
in the primary literature.  To use a comparable source of data, we rely on total expenditure 
interactions rather than interaction in different types of public or publicly provided private goods 
(e.g., health, education, cultural goods). We restrict our analysis to studies that address strategic 
interactions; hence studies examining spatial dependence per se are not not automatically 
included in our sample unless they offers a specific empirical treatment of strategic interactions.  
 
Through MRA, we take stock of the existing evidence and address four sets of issues. 
First, we depart forma very simple first exercise where we explore whether strategic interactions 
or competition between rival jurisdictions does indeed affect government behavior and shape 
expenditure levels. Second, we examine whether such expenditure interactions are more likely to 
occur in homogenous communities (e.g. local authorities within states) than at higher levels of 
aggregation of the government unit (e.g. at the state or national level). We then extend our 
analysis to differences between countries. Third, we seek to identify the institutional and 
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regulatory factors that shape between-country differences. Specifically, we investigate whether 
expenditure interactions arise from tax competition and/or yardstick competition. Both give raise 
to different mechanisms, namely either react to the threat of mobility or to the thread of ‘no re-
election’ of the jurisdictional incumbent (Salmon, 1987; Besley and Case, 1995; Breton, 1996). 
Finally, we wish to explain the large degree of heterogeneity in reported results between studies. 
Why do studies report different results? Our variable of interest is the partial correlation between 
expenditures made by rival jurisdictions, controlling for the effects of a range of other factors. 
That is, the paper focusses on the analysis of expenditure interactions: meta-analysis of tax 
competition literature is beyond the scope of this study. 
MRA is particularly well suited to drawing inferences from a literature that reports 
diverse estimates and where there is heterogeneity in the institutional settings and econometric 
models adopted. Applications of MRA include Doucouliagos and Paldam (2008) on the growth 
effects of aid, Efendic, Pugh and Adnett (2011) on institutions and economic performance, Feld 
and Heckemeyer (2011) on FDI and taxation, and Alptekin and Levine (2012) on military 
expenditure and growth. Our innovation is to apply MRA to explore dimensions that were not 
considered by the primary studies. We take advantage of the between-study heterogeneity to 
provide further insights into inter-jurisdiction competition and to explore additional dimensions. 
We do this by collecting information on the degree of capital controls, voter turnout, and the 
degree of decentralization of the jurisdictions investigated by primary studies. That is, we assess 
the evidence base by drawing upon data from within the studies themselves (such as reported 
estimates of strategic interactions) as well as information that was not considered by the authors, 
such as the degree of political participation and regulation of capital mobility that applied at the 
time the samples were taken. This enables us to model both the heterogeneity within the primary 
studies themselves (through their chosen econometric model), plus the heterogeneity in the 
samples used by different studies that was not previously modeled by the studies.  
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2. From Primary Analysis to Meta-Analysis  
The fiscal interactions literature has progressed through several waves of research. The 
earlier empirical literature focused on welfare migration caused by competition for mobile 
resources.5 The subsequent and much larger empirical literature has focused on neighborhood 
effects by directly estimating fiscal reaction functions. Some of these studies investigate tax 
competition, while others focus on expenditure competition. The literature then moved on to 
estimate reaction functions between jurisdictions at different levels. Expenditure interactions  are 
modeled as reaction functions of the ith jurisdiction’s expenditure choices ( itE ) in year t, 
depending on the choices of the jth neighboring  jurisdiction at time t, plus other variables that 
also explain the jurisdiction’s expenditure: 
itti3it
iv
vtvt2jt
ij
jt10it EEE µδαγωγωγγ ++++++= ∑∑
≠≠
X           (1) 
where 3210 ,,, γγγγ  are parameters to be estimated, jtE  refers to the fiscal choices of the j 
neighboring jurisdiction at time t (horizontal competition), vtE  refers to the fiscal choices of the 
v higher level governments at time t (vertical competition)6, jtω  and vtω are the associated 
‘spatial weights’ that account for the influence of rival jurisdictions, itX is a vector of other 
variables that affect a jurisdiction’s expenditure, and iα and tδ  are region and time fixed effects, 
respectively.  
 In estimating Eq. (1) researchers need to make several choices. First, there is the choice 
of the expenditure to be modeled; total expenditure or a specific component, such as health or 
5 There have also been some important recent papers on this theme, e.g., Schaltegger, Somogyi and Sturm (2011). 
6 Actually, in contrast to the tax competition literature, very few spending/welfare competition studies include the 
vertical competition term. 
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education. A second choice involves the appropriate weight to assign to rival jurisdictions. Most 
studies weigh geographical contiguity positively in the spatial weights matrix (ω), though studies 
attach different weights to geographical neighbors (e.g., Case 1993 and Case, Rosen and Hines 
1993), or use some alternative weighing scheme, such as cross state news media influences 
(Edmark, 2007) or migration patterns (Figlio, Kolpin and Reid, 1999). The third choice variable 
is the most efficient estimator. The main concern with Eq. (1) is the simultaneity problem created 
by the strategic interaction of competing governments. This is a type of “spatial lag” that can 
create an omitted variable bias under OLS estimation. Alternatives to OLS are the Maximum 
Likelihood estimator, IV, and spatial GMM (Saavedra, 2000; Edmark, 2007; Kelejian and 
Prucha, 1998 and 1999).   
Estimation of Eq.(1) generates estimates of strategic interactions ( ), 21 γγ . Meta-analysis 
involves identifying studies that report such estimates and coding these as well as other 
characteristics of the studies that generate them. When suitably converted, these estimates can be 
made comparable between studies and then included in the MRA; they form the ‘meta-data’ for 
our meta-analysis. The MRA model involves regressing estimates of inter-jurisdictional 
expenditure interactions against a constant and a set of variables that can explain the 
heterogeneity in estimates, such as data, specification and estimation differences in research 
design: 
    ijjkkij vr ++= Zββ0         (j=1, 2, …L)               (2) 
 
Where rij are comparable estimates of the ith inter-jurisdictional expenditure interactions from 
study j, i.e. the transformations of estimates of 1γ for horizontal inter-governmental expenditure 
competition from Eq. (1), vij is the random error term and Zjk are moderator variables used to 
explain the large within and between study heterogeneity routinely found in economics research 
(Stanley and Jarrell, 1989). The logic of Eq. (2) is that reported estimates will vary as a result of 
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sampling error (the vij term) and a set of variables used to capture features of the data used and 
the way in which the studies were conducted (Roberts and Stanley, 2005; Doucouliagos and 
Ulubasoglu, 2008).  Eq. (2) enables us to quantify the impact of misspecification and omitted 
variable biases in the primary literature.  
Estimation of the MRA model, Eq. (2), is carried out using weighted least squares (WLS) 
with standard errors adjusted for data clustering. Eq. (2) uses multiple estimates per study. 
Multiple estimates reported within a single study might not be statistically independent of each 
other, violating one of the OLS assumptions. Hence, we adjust the standard errors for data 
clustering, using each study in our meta-dataset as a distinct cluster (estimates are assumed to be 
clustered within studies).7 Estimates of strategic interactions and their partial correlation 
transformations will have different variances (heteroscedasticity): This is evident from the funnel 
plot, Figure 1 discussed below. WLS corrects this heteroscedasticity. We use precision as the 
weights, assigning larger weight to estimates with greater precision.  
 
3. The Meta-Data 
The data for the meta-regression analysis needs to satisfy three criteria: they should be 
comprehensive, comparable and representative. We followed the MAER-NET guidelines in 
constructing the database and conducting the MRA (see Stanley et al. 2013). 
 
3.1 Study selection  
We carried out a comprehensive search for all empirical studies that reported comparable 
estimates of inter-government welfare competition. The search for studies involved numerous 
7 An alternative approach is to use a linear hierarchical model (typically estimated using Restricted Maximum 
Likelihood, or REML). However, the random effects introduced by REML may not be independent of the 
underlying heterogeneity in the meta-data. If this is the case, then random effects estimates will be biased (Stanley, 
2008). We report REML estimates as part of robustness tests. 
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keywords and search engines, as well as checking all references cited within prior studies. We 
searched both published material (books and journal papers), as well as the so-called “Grey 
literature” (unpublished working papers, conference papers and dissertations). We searched for 
all studies published in either English or French. The search was terminated in December 2012. 
We excluded several studies that did not provide sufficient information from which we could 
calculate comparable effect sizes (in our case the partial correlations discussed below). This 
search process identified 33 studies of horizontal expenditure competition that report 369 
estimates and 3 studies of vertical expenditure competition that report 20 estimates. Due to the 
small number of studies and estimates, we do not consider vertical expenditure competition in the 
rest of this paper.8 The studies included in our meta-dataset cover only developed countries, 
predominantly the USA, Sweden, the UK, and Switzerland (see Table 1, column 1).9  
 
Table 1: Country Composition of Estimates of Inter-Jurisdictional Expenditure 
Interactions  
Country  Number of studies 
(estimates) 
(1) 
Tax revenue 
decentralization 
(2) 
Capital  
controls 
(3) 
Voter  
turnout 
(4) 
USA  15 (156) 38.10 (6.75) 8.12 (0.75) 54.04 (8.19) 
Sweden  6 (68) 44.07 (1.05) 7.91 (1.71) 81.58 (3.26) 
UK  5 (30) 6.33 (3.06) 9.17 (0.45) 44.37 (3.35) 
Switzerland  2 (21) 55.67 (0.56) 9.53 (0.14) 44.70 (0.84) 
All studies 341 (32) 32.08 (15.02) 7.92 (1.22) 62.38 (14.87) 
Note: Cells in columns 2 to 4 report averages with standard deviations in brackets. 
 
8 This poses no problems for our MRA of horizontal expenditure competition, as the inclusion of vertical 
expenditure competition in the primary econometric study does not to have any noteworthy difference on the 
estimates of horizontal expenditure competition. 
9 The data are available from (website suppressed for refereeing purposes) to enable replication and extension of our 
study. An appendix with the studies included in the meta-analysis is also available at this address. 
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As noted above, studies estimate some version of Eq. (1). In doing so, they differ in the 
way in which the dependent and explanatory variables are measured. Moreover, there are often 
differences in the scale of measurement used. Hence, the regression coefficients from Eq.(1) are 
not directly comparable across all studies (and estimates) included in the dataset (Becker and 
Wu, 2007). Following Djankov and Murrell (2002) and Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu (2008), 
we converted the study results into partial correlations. Our focus in this paper is purely on the 
direct effect of the neighboring governments’ choice variable. Hence, we abstract from the 
various spatial impacts (LeSage and Fischer, 2007).10 
The partial correlations measure the degree of correlation between expenditures made by 
rival jurisdictions, controlling for the effects of variables that are unrelated to strategic 
interactions. Partial correlations are interpreted in the same manner as simple correlations. They 
are a unit-less measure of the strength and direction of jurisdictional interaction: The higher the 
partial correlation, the stronger the strategic interaction. While the partial correlation is a 
correlation, the underlying econometric models it is derived from are deemed to be causal models 
by their authors. Hence, to the extent that estimates of inter-jurisdictional competition are causal 
(they measure the effect of the spending decisions of other jurisdictions), then the partial 
correlations can also be interpreted as a causal measure. 
While there are 369 reported estimates from 33 studies, in the empirical analysis we use 
341 observations from 32 studies. Some observations are lost because (i) we are unable to match 
some estimates with data on capital controls, voter turnout and tax revenue decentralization (see 
section 4 below) and (ii) we removed 7 observations which were clear outliers.11  
10 Unfortunately, studies rarely report enough information from which these other effects can be calculated and 
included in a meta-analysis. Hence, by necessity, the MRA can only be conducted on the direct effect of rival 
jurisdictions. 
11 We used standardized residuals to identify outliers. Removing these outliers is also justified statistically as this 
improves the MRA model diagnostics. 
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The partial correlations for welfare competition are illustrated in figure 1, in the form of a 
funnel plot. The funnel plot illustrates the distribution of the partial correlations. Specifically, 
they trace the association between partial correlations and their associated precision, measured 
here as the inverse of the associated standard error (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2010; Stanley and 
Doucouliagos, 2012). The funnel plot shows two important pieces of information. First, it 
illustrates that the greater majority of estimated partial correlations are positive, indicating 
positive strategic interactions. There is, however, a fairly wide range of results reported in the 
literature. MRA can be used to explain this heterogeneity (see section 5 below). Second, it 
highlights the position of the central tendency of the results. The more precise estimates are 
closer together and tend to converge towards what might be considered to be the ‘real’ 
underlying effect. In our dataset, the weighted average of all partial correlation is +.07, 
suggesting a small positive degree of inter-jurisdiction expenditure interactions. 
 
Figure 1: Funnel Plot for Estimates of Horizontal Welfare Competition 
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Notes: The solid line denotes the position of weighted average partial correlation (+.07). The dash line 
denotes the position of a zero partial correlation. The vertical axis measures precision calculated as the 
inverse of the standard error of the partial correlation. 
 
 
 
3.2 Data comparability 
It is essential that the estimates included in the meta-dataset are comparable so that they 
can be included in the MRA. Our data consists of all estimates of welfare competition in 
published and unpublished studies. We confirmed data comparability by running three tests. 
First, we tested whether partial correlations differed significantly between published and 
unpublished studies. Second, we tested whether study results differ according to the quality of 
the journal in which they were reported. We used the 2009 Social Science Citation Index Journal 
Impact Factors as proxies for study quality, assigning a zero weight to unpublished studies and to 
any journal that is not indexed in the SSCI. Third, we regressed the precision of the estimated 
partial correlations against the same Impact Factors. The results of these tests are reported in 
Table 2, columns 1, 2 and 3, respectively.12 We found no significant difference in partial 
correlations between published and unpublished studies (column 1) and no difference on the 
basis of the quality of the journal as measured by journal Impact Factors (columns 2 and 3). In 
contrast, we show below that the partial correlations do vary as a result of measurement, data, 
specification, and estimator differences.  
Our dataset purposefully includes estimates from different dimensions: estimates at 
different jurisdiction levels, in different countries, at different time periods, and for different 
types of expenditures. Expenditure on health, security, and infrastructure expenditures can be 
regarded as three different types of policy choices; internal redistributive, external threat, and 
internal developmental. Fiscal interactions might vary along these dimensions, e.g., redistributive 
12 For these estimates we include all observations except the outliers discussed in above.  
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spending may result in race-to-the-bottom while public spending on development might yield 
efficient competitive processes and positive effects. The benefit of pooling these estimates 
together is that it enables us to formally test whether there are significant differences between 
fiscal interactions along these dimensions. The key advantage of MRA is that it can deal with 
such heterogeneity. MRA enables the identification of multiple dimensions of heterogeneity. 
That is, instead of a priori assuming that strategic interactions differ along these dimensions, we 
statistically test whether they do differ.  
 
Table 2: Meta-data Comparability and Publication Selection Bias Tests 
 (1) (2) (3) FAT-PET (4) 
Constant .058  
(2.39) 
.056  
(2.72) 
29.339  
(6.24) 
.026 
 (1.09) 
     
Published .011 
 (0.37) 
- - - 
     
SSCI impact 
factor 
- .009  
(0.65) 
-3.164 
 (-1.46) 
- 
 
     
Standard  
error 
- - - 1.245  
(1.82) 
     
Adjusted R2 .001 .005 .063 .042 
Notes: The number of observations is 355 estimates from 33 studies. The dependent variable in columns 1, 2 and 4 is 
the partial correlation. The dependent variable in column 3 is the precision of the partial correlation. Columns 1, 2 
and 4 are estimated using WLS, with precision as the weights. Column 3 is estimated using OLS. Brackets report t-
statistics using standard errors corrected for the clustering of observations within studies. 
 
 
3.3 Publication selection bias  
Publication selection bias occurs when authors and/or journals have a preference for 
statistically significant results or a preference for results consistent with a certain theory 
(Doucouliagos and Paldam, 2008). In such cases, authors do not report all of the results they 
uncover. Rather, they select results that are consistent with their priors, or results which they 
believe have a stronger chance of being published. The effect of this process is that certain 
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findings are suppressed while others are over-represented. Consequently, inferences drawn from 
an empirical literature maybe biased.13 Typically, the bias is in favor of rejecting the null 
hypothesis of a zero effect. Hence, publication selection bias will tend to inflate the magnitude of 
an empirical effect.  
Stanley (2005, 2008) advocates a simple, though powerful, test for publication bias – the 
funnel asymmetry precision effect size test (FAT-PET). This involves regressing the partial 
correlations against a constant and the partial correlation’s standard error (SEij). The logic of this 
test is that estimates should not be correlated with their standard errors if a literature is free of 
publication selection bias (Egger et al., 1997; Stanley 2005, 2008). If researchers search for 
estimates that are statistically significant, then they will re-estimate their models until the 
relationship between r and SE achieves some acceptable standard of statistical significance (e.g. a 
t-statistic of 1.96). This process will generate a correlation between the partial correlations with 
their standard errors (Stanley, 2008).14 The FAT-PET results are reported in Table 2, column 4. 
We find no evidence of a statistically significant association between the partial correlations and 
their standard errors. Hence, we conclude that this literature is free of publication selection bias. 
This is a rather heartening finding given evidence reported elsewhere that there is a large degree 
of selection bias in economics (see the papers in Roberts and Stanley, 2005) and in political 
science (see Gerber, Malhotra, Dowling and Doherty, 2010). 
 
4. Regulation, political participation and decentralization 
Heterogeneity may arise from genuine empirical differences in the underlying 
government reaction functions (e.g. differences in the expenditure function, countries and time 
13 This bias affects all reviews of the evidence based, be they systematic reviews of the evidence, qualitative 
literature reviews, or formal statistically based assessments like MRA. 
14 Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012) argue that publication selection bias is analogous to sample selection biases and 
that it can be modeled as a Heckman-type regression; the MRA with a selection bias adjustment replaces the inverse 
Mills ratio term with the effect size’s standard error.  
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period analyzed), or it can arise from differences in the specification of Eq. (1). (e.g. differences 
in the weights used, control variables and estimator). We use the MRA model in Eq. (2) to help 
us to quantify both the effects of misspecification and genuine differences in strategic 
interactions.  
One advantage of MRA is that it is able to explore associations that might not have been 
considered by the primary studies. We hypothesize that strategic interactions will be moderated 
by regulation, political participation, and the structure of federations.  
 
4.1 Capital mobility 
By impacting upon revenues, tax competition can drive and shape inter-jurisdictional 
expenditure spillovers. Tax driven strategic interactions require capital mobility; the more mobile 
capital is the more likely that jurisdictions will engage in tax competition. For federations such as 
the EU, we posit that easing capital controls increases capital mobility, stimulating tax 
competition which in turn generates expenditure interactions. If this is the case, the partial 
correlation of expenditure choices between rival jurisdictions will be positively related to the 
degree of regulation in capital controls.15 A similar process is postulated for jurisdictions within 
single country federations (e.g., the USA), particularly when jurisdictions have a balanced budget 
requirement. This causal relationship between capital mobility and tax competition  
We explore this association by including the variable CapitalControl in the MRA. If 
CapitalControl has a positive coefficient in the MRA, then this is consistent with the notion that 
expenditure interactions are driven by tax competition. We use data from the Fraser Institute on 
15 Some authors have found that that capital mobility might have no effect on tax rates and that it might even 
increase them (Lockwood and Makris, 2006 and Lai 2010 and references therein). Our hypothesis is that capital 
controls will shape the magnitude of fiscal interactions. The resulting impact on the direction of tax rates – driving 
tax rates down or pushing them up – is an entirely different issue. 
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International Capital Market Controls.16 This series is available only at the national level. 
Nevertheless, the national data should serve as a reasonably good proxy for capital controls at the 
sub-national government level, as capital controls are often imposed at the national level but their 
effect is felt throughout the economy and state and federal regulations often move together17 
A positive relationship between the partial correlation of expenditure choices between 
rival jurisdictions and the degree of capital control regulations can also emerge when countries 
loosen capital controls and also devolve authority and financial resources to lower level 
jurisdictions. In this scenario, jurisdictions are given more to spend from the Federal government 
and they have greater choice in regulations and taxes they can impose, and public expenditures 
they can made. Consequently, in our MRA we control for the degree of tax revenue 
decentralization and we also control for whether the primary estimates controlled for grants 
received from the Federal government.   
 
4.2 Political participation 
Our second constructed variable relates to political participation.18 According to yardstick 
competition theory, voters make inter-jurisdictional comparisons as an attempt to overcome 
agency problems (Besley and Case, 1995; Wilson and Gordon, 2003). If this process holds, then 
there should be a positive correlation between inter-jurisdiction interactions and the degree of 
political competition. As a measure of this process, we considered the Polity series on political 
competition (Polity2). However, this series displayed no variation for the countries included in 
16 This is the series 4E, International Capital Market Controls. The maximum value of the series is 10, which denotes 
the most liberal regime, free of all international capital market controls. 
17 For example, analysis of US sub-national labor market regulation data for the 1981 to 2010 period (Bueno, Ashby 
and McMahon, 2012) shows that labor market regulations are highly correlated in the majority of regions, with most 
correlations exceeding 0.70.   
18 Political participation is a different phenomenon from political competition. We would prefer to have data on 
political competition, such as the electoral margin of the top two candidates in each set of elections, but this 
information is unavailable for many of the samples used in our meta-study. 
 16 
                                               
our dataset. Instead, we chose to use data on voter turnout, VoterTurnout; this is the total number 
of votes cast (both valid and invalid) divided by the number of names on the voters' register. We 
constructed this series using data from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance and from various national and sub-national electoral bodies. We matched as closely as 
possible the level at which expenditure competition is occurring with voter turnout. Thus, for 
competition between nations we used voter turnout in national elections, while for competition at 
the municipality level we used voter turnout at municipal elections. We were able to do this for 
86% of the observations. Where it was not possible to match the level of disaggregation we used 
the next level of voter turnout, e.g. use turnout at the state level as a proxy for municipal 
elections and national elections as a proxy for state level turnout. 
The median voter might very well be different at low levels of turnout than at higher 
levels. Arguably, the median voter at low levels of voter turnout will have a higher socio-
economic background and is more likely to be industry friendly. In contrast, the median voter at 
higher levels of voter turnout might have a lower socio-economic background, with a stronger 
preference to increase public expenditure and potentially be less industry friendly. If this is the 
case, then all else equal, voter turnout will be positively correlated with expenditure competition: 
there will then be a positive correlation between voter turnout and the partial correlation between 
the expenditure choices of rival jurisdictions. 
 
4.3 Fiscal decentralization 
A third variable is Fiscal decentralization. Fiscal interactions are driven by decision 
makers with autonomy over benefits and/or taxes. Hence, we expect that fiscal interactions will 
be shaped by the degree of decentralization. However, it is unclear whether fiscal 
decentralization has a positive or negative effect on the partial correlation of expenditure choices 
between rival jurisdictions. Some authors such as Keen and Marchand (1997) predict that fiscal 
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interactions will result in excessive public spending in productive investments and insufficient 
spending on public consumption goods. Others, however, argue that there are factors operating 
that will lead to insufficient investment. The net effect on public spending on investment is thus 
unclear, as is the net effect on total investment.  Tax decentralization is an important driver 
behind these spending biases.19 In order to explore this effect we use the series on tax revenue 
decentralization constructed by Stegarescu (2005).20 A positive (negative) coefficient in the 
MRA indicates that fiscal decentralization increases (decreases) fiscal interactions.  
Descriptive statistics for these three variables are reported in Table 1, columns 2, 3, and 4. 
Capital controls, voter turnout and federal structure vary over time and between countries. We 
take advantage of this variation to explore the effects of regulation, political participation and 
federal structure on strategic interactions. As noted above, while various predictions are possible, 
our own expectations are that tax competition should increase as capital controls ease, while 
yardstick competition should increase as voter turnout rises. If the effects of capital controls on 
strategic interactions are greater (lower) than the effects of voter turnout, then we can conclude 
that tax competition (yardstick competition) is more prominent.  
 
5. MRA Results 
Various versions of the MRA model, Eq.(2), were estimated and the key results are 
presented in Table 3. We restricted the MRA to 27 variables that capture the main differences in 
the data, specification and estimation of Eq. (1).21 Column 1 lists the moderator variables and 
19 Kappeler, Solé-Ollé, Stephan and Vӓlilӓ (2013) point out that sub-national jurisdictions are responsible for most 
public infrastructure. Kappeler and Välilä (2008) and Kappeler, Solé-Ollé, Stephan and Vӓlilӓ (2013) find that 
decentralization increases spending on infrastructure and public goods but not on redistributive outlays. 
20 Higher values indicate a greater degree of decentralization. Other series are available, such as IMF’s Government 
Finance Statistics and the Fiscal Empowerment series by Boex and Simatupang (2008). However, these data series 
tend to overstate the degree of decentralization (Stegarescu, 2005).  
21 As part of robustness checks, we also expanded the MRA model to include other variables in the MRA, but these 
were not statistically significant in explaining observed heterogeneity; see Table 5 below.  
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their means and standard deviations. The first of these is Standard error which is included to test 
and correct for publication selection bias (Stanley, 2008). This offers a multiple regression 
version of the FAT-PET reported in Table 2. Next we include the three variables (discussed in 
section 4 above) constructed using data collected from sources other than the studies, 
CapitalControl, VoterTurnout and FiscalDecentral (capital market controls, voter turnout, and 
the degree of federalism, respectively). Seven variables are included to capture data differences. 
Differences in the measurement of the dependent variable are reflected in three binary variables, 
Health, Security and Infrastructure, which take the value of 1 if the measure of competition is 
based on spending on health, security, or infrastructure, respectively. The base for this model is 
total expenditure and other types of expenditure.  
The variables State and Nation are binary variables that allow us to test how the level of 
government affects the magnitude of expenditure competition, with municipality as the base. 
Panel is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if panel data are used, with cross-sectional data as 
the base. AverageYear is the average year of the sample used. This variable is included to test 
whether the degree of expenditure competition varies over time. This variable is normalized at 
the mean of the sample, 1991. A negative (positive) sign on this variable would indicate that 
fiscal spending interactions are becoming weaker (stronger) over time. It is also possible that this 
variable might be picking up improvements in the quality of estimates over time or better quality 
data over time. 
Five variables relate to estimation differences. The existence of strategic interactions 
means that expenditure policies are endogenous and determined jointly by competing policy 
makers. The variables IV and ML are binary variables that capture any difference in estimates 
that address this endogeneity by instrumenting spending competition and the use of maximum 
likelihood estimation, respectively. OtherNonOLS is a binary variable for studies that use other 
estimators. Time effects is a binary variable for those studies that use panel data and control for 
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fixed time period effects.22 Most studies use contiguity or distance to assign weights to rival 
jurisdictions: The further away a jurisdiction is, the less weight it is assigned. NoWeight is a 
binary variable taking the value of 1 for studies that take a simple average of other regions.  
The variables Sweden, UK and AllOthers capture any national differences, with the USA 
as the base. Since the MRA also includes CapitalControl, VoterTurnout and FiscalDecentral, the 
three country dummies are picking up any remaining unobservable differences between countries 
that might affect estimates of government expenditure strategic interactions. Model specification 
differences are reflected in the seven binary variables that capture the effect of including specific 
controls in the primary studies. Grants, Income, Population, Unemployment, Politics, 
Neighborlag and Neighborchar are all binary variables that control whether the primary study 
includes grants, income, population, unemployment, the politics of the ruling party as control 
variables, the use of a lagged measure of the neighbor’s benefit instead of a contemporaneous 
value,23and control for the characteristics of neighboring jurisdictions, rather than just controlling 
of the characteristics of the own jurisdiction, respectively.  
Column 2 presents estimates of the general MRA with all 27 variables when OLS is used, 
with standard errors adjusted for the clustering of observations within studies. These 27 variables 
quantify the main differences between studies in the measures, data, specification and estimation. 
Column 3 presents the same model estimated using WLS, using ‘optimal weights’, i.e., each 
estimate is weighted by its inverse variance. This assigns greater weight to estimates that are 
reported with greater precision. Column 4 presents the results attained through a general-to-
specific modeling strategy, sequentially removing any variable that was not statistically 
significant at least at the 10% level. The reason for estimating this model is that MRA variables 
are often highly collinear and the general-to-specific model reveals the underlying associations 
22 In unreported regressions we also considered fixed jurisdiction effects. This variable was never statistically 
significant.  
23 This is often done to get around the endogeneity between the own and neighbouring jurisdiction’s expenditures. 
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with greater clarity (see Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012).24 Most of the observations included in 
our dataset relate to sub-national fiscal interactions, while 9% relate to national fiscal 
interactions. In column 5 we present the results of just sub-national fiscal interactions. Columns 2 
to 5 use a WLS fixed effects MRA. In contrast, column 6 reports the results from a random 
effects MRA. These results are presented here for the sake of robustness. Stanley and 
Doucouliagos (2012) caution against the use of this estimator in the case of observational data as 
the random effects may not be independent of the underlying heterogeneity in the meta-data, 
resulting in biased estimates. 
The MRA models reported in columns 2 to 5 explain over 40% of the variation in partial 
correlations. This is actually a fairly large proportion of the variation, given that it highly likely 
that there will be much random variation in estimates of strategic interactions. The preferred 
models are reported in columns 3 and 4. Both of these models various normal diagnostic tests.25  
The constant in these MRA models measures the degree of expenditure competition (as measured 
by partial correlations) for studies using US data on total expenditures at the municipality level, 
using cross-sectional data for 1991, estimated by OLS, without any of the controls listed in the 
table, using distance to weigh neighbors’ spending and setting the three institutional data 
variables to zero. The MRA variables are then interpreted relative to this constant. A statistically 
significant negative (positive) coefficient in the MRA indicates that the variable reduces 
(increases) the size of the fiscal interaction.  
Several robust results emerge from Table 3. First, Standard error is never statistically 
significant when WLS is used. This confirms the findings from Table 2 (column 4) that there is 
no significant publication selection in this literature. Second, we find that relaxing capital 
controls (higher values of CapitalControl) increases interdependence between jurisdictions. This 
can be explained by the spillover effects of tax competition on expenditure competition. 
24 A Wald test was conducted to confirm that the omitted variables were redundant. 
25The MRA model reported in column 4 passes the RESET test (p-value = 0.60) and the linktest (p-value = 0.27). 
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Competing for mobile capital through the relaxation of capital controls effectively results in 
linking expenditure decisions between jurisdictions. Keeping the tax base and federal grants 
constant, a change in the tax rate alters revenues and hence expenditure. This flows on to the 
expenditure decisions of rival jurisdictions.  
Decentralization (higher values of FiscalDecentral), on the other hand, has the opposite 
effect of relaxing capital controls; decentralization reduces welfare and spending competition. 
This means that when jurisdictions have greater tax revenue autonomy they are less likely to 
engage in strategic spending interactions with rival jurisdictions. In other words, the less 
autonomy they have in raising their own revenue, the more likely they are to use spending as a 
policy instrument. Hence, a negative coefficient in the MRA is consistent with the view that 
fiscal decentralization is more likely to result in increased tax competition than it is in 
expenditure yardstick competition.  When taken together, the results from CapitalControl and 
FiscalDecentral suggest that the effects of relaxing capital controls are weaker when fiscal 
decentralization is greater.  
Voter turnout appears to have no effect on expenditure competition.26 We interpret this to 
mean that political participation does not moderate strategic spending interactions. This suggests 
that yardstick competition effects do not operate with regard to public spending, in the countries 
covered by our data. Hence, we conclude from the MRA results that expenditure interactions 
appear to be driven by tax competition rather than yardstick competition.  
 
26 One possible explanation for this is the ability of jurisdictions to manipulate who is actually eligible to vote. This 
can also arise when jurisdictions are very heterogenous with respect to the median voter. 
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Table 3: Meta-Regression Analysis of Inter-Jurisdictional Expenditure Competition 
(Dependent variable is partial correlations)  
Variable Mean 
(S.D.) 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
WLS 
(3) 
General to 
Specific 
(WLS) 
(4) 
Without nation 
estimates 
(5) 
REML 
(6) 
Constant  -.23 (1.22) -.29 (1.61) -.21 (1.94) -.21 (1.92) -.23 (1.29) 
Standard error .05 (.03) 1.41 (1.81) 1.35 (1.41) - - 1.41 (3.26) 
Regulation, political participation and decentralization 
CapitalControl 7.98 (1.15) .08 (4.28)  .06 (2.34) .04 (5.00) .04 (4.95) .08 (7.10) 
VoterTurnout 62.30(14.50) -.01 (0.78) .01 (0.57) - - -.01 (0.88) 
FiscalDecentral 30.80(15.75) -.01 (2.07) -.01 (1.47) -.01 (3.68) -.01 (3.70) -.01 (3.72) 
Data differences 
Health  .09 (.28) -.01 (0.35) .02 (1.34) - - -.01 (0.34) 
Security .06 (.25) -.20 (4.34) -.16 (4.48) -.16 (3.94) -.16 (3.70) -.20 (6.83) 
Infrastructure .08 (.27) -.01 (0.30) .01 (0.42) - - -.01 (0.34) 
State  .40 (.49) -.14 (2.90) -.15 (2.80) -.10 (3.49) -.10 (3.41) -.14 (3.95) 
Nation .09 (.29) -.25 (1.87) -.40 (3.08) -.19 (3.68) - -.25 (2.79) 
Panel  .75 (.43) .17 (1.90) .14 (1.54) .14 (2.05) .14 (2.06) .17 (5.75) 
AverageYear 2.67 (6.94) -.01 (1.36) -.01 (2.01) -.01 (2.78) -.01 (2.71) -.01 (1.73) 
Estimator differences 
Time effects .56 (.50) -.07 (1.56) -.06 (2.59) -.06 (1.65) -.06 (1.66) -.07 (2.96) 
IV .38 (.49) 0.01 (0.54) -.03 (1.85) - - .01 (0.70) 
ML .26 (.44) .02 (0.48) -.02 (0.55) - - 0.02 (0.76) 
OtherNonOLS .07 (.26) -.03 (1.09) -.05 (1.79) - - -.03 (1.06) 
NoWeight .10 (.30) -.04 (1.27) -.04 (1.21) - - -.04 (1.44) 
Country differences 
Sweden .18 (.38) -.05 (0.41) -.13 (0.90) - - -.05 (0.50) 
UK .08 (.28) -.35 (2.07) -.21 (0.89) - - -.35 (3.37) 
AllOthers .17 (.38) -.21 (1.43) -.18 (1.10) - - -.21 (2.27) 
Specification differences 
Grants .59 (.49) .13 (3.63) .06 (1.69) .07 (3.09) .07 (3.06) .13 (4.89) 
Income .68 (.47) -.04 (0.91) -.05 (1.18) - - -.04 (1.53) 
Neighborlag .12 (.32) -.01 (0.25) -.03 (2.17) -.02 (1.79) -.02 (1.82) -.01 (0.31) 
Neighborchar .15 (.36) -.05 (1.86) -.04 (1.65) -.05 (1.95) -.05 (1.95) -.05 (1.82) 
Politics .49 (.50) .15 (5.15) .13 (3.88) .09 (5.80) .10 (5.54) .15 (7.60) 
Population .79 (.41) .05 (1.32) .07 (2.65) 0.06 (1.96) .06 (1.97) .05 (2.00) 
Unemployment .54 (.50) -.10 (2.61) -.11 (3.02) -.09 (3.65) -.09 (3.66) -.10 (4.36) 
F-test  327.32 [0.00] 
529.04 
[0.00] 
38.59 
[0.00] 
39.66 
[0.00] 
329.48 
[0.00] 
Adjusted R2  .47 .42 .42 .43 - 
Notes: The number of observations is 341 estimates from 32 studies for columns 2 to 4 and 6, and 309 estimates 
from 30 studies in column 5. Cell entries in bold denote statistical significance at least at the 10% level. Cell entries 
in brackets in columns 2 to 6 report absolute values of t-statistics derived using standard errors adjusted for data 
clustering. Column 2 uses OLS, while columns 3 to 5 use weighted least squares using precision as weights. Column 
6 reports results of a random effects MRA estimated using Restricted Maximum Likelihood.  
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A third finding is that data makes a significant difference. The negative coefficient on 
Security indicates that inter-jurisdictional expenditure competition is smaller with respect to 
security. The level of the jurisdiction is also important. The State and Nation variables both have 
negative coefficients in the MRA. The use of state or nation level data results in smaller 
expenditure competition effects, compared to the base (municipality data). That is, strategic 
interactions appear to be weaker amongst rival states and nations than they are at lower level 
jurisdictions. Panel has a positive coefficient indicating that studies that use panel data report 
stronger strategic interactions than studies that use cross-sectional data. AverageYear has a 
negative coefficient indicating that welfare competition is time variant and has been declining 
over time. The country dummy variables are not statistically significant in the preferred WLS 
models. This means that there are no country differences in fiscal interactions conditionally on 
capital controls and fiscal decentralization differences.  
Our fourth finding is that, surprisingly, the estimation variables are not important in 
explaining the variation in the reported results. The one possible exception is that the inclusion of  
time fixed effects results in smaller strategic interactions. The use of an IV or a maximum 
likelihood estimator does not appear to make a noticeable different to reported results once other 
differences in data and research designed are controlled for. Not using any weights at all (treating 
all jurisdictions equally) also makes no difference to the reported estimates of expenditure 
competition. 
Fifth, econometric specification also matters. The inclusion of grants, the politics of the 
party in office, and population in an econometric model all result in larger welfare interactions. 
In contrast, unemployment, the neighbor’s spending levels lagged and characteristics of 
neighboring jurisdictions, all result in smaller effects.  
The MRA coefficients can be used to estimate the degree of expenditure interactions 
arising from inter-jurisdictional competition. We report such estimates in Table 4, for the US and 
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for all countries combined, for total spending and spending on security, and at the municipal and 
state jurisdiction levels. In forming such estimates we can use country specific data on capital 
controls and fiscal decentralization. We assume that the inter-jurisdiction competition occurs at 
either the municipality or the county level and that a well constructed model will include controls 
for grants, the politics of the party, population, and unemployment.27 The average of all countries 
combined (column 2 of the first row of Table 4) shows a positive partial correlation between 
rival jurisdictions spending. This suggests the existence of a negative spending externality. A 
positive partial correlation means that the ith jurisdiction will reduce its spending when other 
jurisdictions decrease theirs. That is, the rival jurisdictions decisions have an adverse effect on 
the ith jurisdiction. However, it also means that when other jurisdictions increase their spending, 
it becomes easier for the ith jurisdiction to increase spending. The point estimates of interactions 
for the US (the second row of Table 4) are slightly lower than for all countries combined. 
However, the 95% confidence intervals overlap significantly so that there is no practical 
difference in the size of the interactions. Table 4 also confirms that interactions at the 
municipal/county level are significantly larger than those at the state/provincial level, with little 
overlap in the confidence intervals. In all cases, there is no evidence of fiscal interactions with 
regarding to spending on security: the point estimates vary from positive to negative but the 
confidence intervals include zero. 
Cohen (1988) provides well-known guidelines for the practical significance of a 
correlation: 0.1 for a small effect, 0.30 is medium, and anything larger than 0.5 is a large effect. 
Doucouliagos (2011) provides similar guidelines for the practical significance of a partial 
correlation: 0.07 is a small effect, 0.17 is a moderate effect and 0.33 is a large effect. Hence, we 
can conclude that fiscal spending interactions at the municipality jurisdiction level are moderate 
in size and of some practical importance.  
27 We also assume that panel data are used and that model is estimated using either IV, or maximum likelihood or 
OLS with a lag value in the rival jurisdictions spending, with time effects included.  
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Table 4:  Summary of MRA Estimates of Spatial Interactions, US and All Countries 
combined 
 
 Municipality/County 
jurisdiction State jurisdiction 
 Security 
spending 
Other 
spending 
Security 
spending 
Other 
spending 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
All Countries .04 
(-.07 to .14) 
.20  
(.13 to .27) 
-.06 
(-.17 to .04) 
.09 
(.03 to .16) 
     
USA .02 
(-.09 to .12) 
.17  
(.10 to .25) 
-.09 
(-.19 to .02) 
.07 
(.01 to .14) 
     
Note: MRA predictions using regression coefficients reported in column 4 of Table 3. 95% confidence 
intervals reported in brackets. 
 
 
  
Robustness 
Table 5 reports the results of various robustness checks on the general-to-specific MRA 
model reported in column 4 of Table 3, which is reproduced in row 1 for comparison. Note, 
however, that we add back in VoterTurnout to this specific model. Table 5 reports the 
coefficients on the CapitalControl, VoterTurnout, and FiscalDecentral variables. First, instead of 
adjusting standard errors for data clustering, we re-estimated the MRA model using a multilevel 
mixed effects model estimated using REML.  The key difference is that voter turnout now 
emerges with a statistically significant negative coefficient; greater political participation reduces 
strategic interactions between jurisdictions. Row 3 reports the results of re-estimating the MRA 
without adjusting standard errors for data clustering. Row 4 reports the results using robust 
regression, which is less sensitive to the effects of outliers. The MRA was also re-estimated with 
the addition of more control variables (see the notes to Table 5). These results are reported in row 
5. Finally, row 6 reports the results of adding study fixed effects to the MRA. This model focuses 
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only on the within study differences in reported results and is not comparable to the other 
models. With the exception of row 6, the results are robust to these alternative approaches.  
 
Table 5: Robustness of MRA   
 
 Capital controls Voter turnout Decentralization 
Main results (1) .04 (5.00) -.01 (-0.27) -.01 (-3.68) 
REML (2) .05 (5.94) -.01 (-2.07) -.01 (-2.72) 
Without clustering (3) .04 (6.08) -.01 (-0.39) -.01 (-5.73) 
Robust regression (4) .05 (5.42) -.01 (-1.23) -.01 (-3.12) 
With additional controls (5) .04 (3.17) -.01 (-0.55) -.01 (-1.75) 
Fixed effects (6) .05 (1.08) .01 (0.14) -.03 (-4.19) 
    
Notes: The first row reports the results of the model reported in table 3, column 4, with the addition of the 
VoterTurnout variable. The second row uses a multilevel mixed effects model estimated using restricted 
maximum likelihood. The third row uses WLS but does not adjust standard errors for data clustering. The fourth   
row uses robust regression. The fifth row adds additional controls variables: welfare spending, education 
spending, a dummy for jurisdiction fixed effects, GMM estimator, non-contiguity weights, Switzerland, and 
vertical expenditure competition. The sixth row adds study fixed effects. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper investigates the extent and magnitude of strategic expenditure interactions 
between jurisdictions, namely the extent to which expenditure in one jurisdiction is influenced by 
rival jurisdictions’ actions. Meta-regression analysis was applied account for the number of 
potential biases each study could embrace as well as different study and institutional 
characteristics that could have influenced one particular study but that can be accounted when 
several estimates are pooled together. We draw several robust conclusions from our analysis. 
The evidence points strongly to the existence of inter-jurisdictional expenditure 
interdependence among lower level jurisdictions (counties and municipalities). However, 
compared to the municipality level, horizontal expenditure competition is smaller when the 
jurisdiction is a State. That is, the strategic interactions are more pronounced at the municipal and 
county levels, and less so at the State level. In contrast, we find an absence of interactions with 
respect to spending on security.  The MRA indicates that expenditure interactions are becoming 
weaker over time. This might be driven by rising political costs of inter-jurisdictional rivalry, as 
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per Basinger and Hallerberg (2004). Alternatively, this might perhaps reflect higher quality 
estimates using better datasets over time. However, our reading of the literature is that the quality 
of data used has not materially changed over time. We also find that much of the observed 
variation in strategic interactions can be explained by differences in the specification of the fiscal 
interactions econometrics model. 
The MRA helps to reveal the causes of inter-jurisdictional interactions. Analysis of the 
effects of regulation, political participation and decentralization indicates that capital controls 
and fiscal decentralization play an instrumental role in shaping expenditure interactions. 
Relaxing capital controls increases strategic interactions whereas granting jurisdictions greater 
tax revenue autonomy decreases strategic interactions. Capital controls, however, appear to be 
more important. Evaluated at sample means, we find that the elasticity of strategic interactions 
with respect to capital controls is 3.97, while the elasticity of strategic interactions with respect to 
decentralization is -1.36. Hence, a one percentage reduction in capital controls has nearly three 
times the effect on strategic interactions as does an equivalent percentage change in 
decentralization. This is consistent with the view that expenditure interactions are caused by tax 
competition between rival jurisdictions. While some of the robustness results suggest otherwise 
(recall Table 5), our main results (Table 3) suggest that political participation is not an important 
factor. This suggests that yardstick competition does not occur at a sufficient degree to drive 
expenditure interactions, at least in the countries and time periods included in our study. This is 
an important finding in so far as would suggest that political decentralization does not engender 
automatically a race to the bottom as some studies have suggested in different settings.  
Potential extensions of our study include performing sector specific analysis into different 
public and/or publicly financed private goods (e,g., education, health care) where other 
characteristics of the services such as the development of complementary insurance or education 
vouchers could influence the direction of the strategic expenditure interaction. Another possible 
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extension includes, examining the different form of spillover effects that could take place 
between different jurisdictions beyond strategic interactions.   
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